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I. SYNOPSIS
This Comment explores the regulatory fallout from the global
financial crisis. Across borders, policy makers are united in their
conviction to reconcile the perceived failures of their predecessors to
foresee and prevent the crisis, the effects of which show no signs of
abating. A critical component of what caused the crisis was the
inability to correct failures in the consumer credit market, specifically
in subprime mortgages. Exacerbated by an influx of capital and a
generally weak regulatory environment, this market failure
manifested itself forcefully through a tidal wave of defaults in the
American mortgage market that sent shock waves around the world.
Unanimously, governments have responded with structural changes
to their regulatory regimes with a renewed emphasis on consumer
financial protection. While developments continue to be in flux, this
comment explains how the structural changes, as currently
understood, will usher in an unprecedented myriad of laws, rules,
guidelines and regulations to be imposed on financial institutions
around the globe.
II. INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis, in exposing fatal flaws in modem
finance, dealt a severe blow to the prestige and power of Western
governments.' The devastating contraction in liquidity brought on by
the crisis begot a deep, lingering, and world-wide recession. 2
Americans in particular, having lost $11 trillion in household wealth,
have experienced lasting hardship in the wake of the crisis. 3 For a
generation the world will be forced to grapple with an economic
1. Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash: A Geopolitical Setback for the West,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2009), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63714/roger-
c-altman/the-great-crash-2008 (discussing how the financial and economic crash of
2008 remains a "major geopolitical setback for the United States and Europe").
2. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Final Report of the National
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United
States XV-XXVII (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.gpoacuss.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf.
3. Id. at xv. Moreover, twenty-six million Americans are unemployed, under-
employed, or have given up looking for work; and eight and a half million
Americans have, or are in the process of, losing their homes in foreclosure
proceeding. Id.
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catastrophe that was avoidable, "the captains of finance and public
stewards of the financial system ignored warnings and failed to
question, understand and manage evolving risk within a system
essential to the well-being of the American public." It should come
as no surprise then that the financial industry is in the midst of a
regulatory revolution.
Reforming the financial system in order to prevent another
disaster in administrative oversight has been the focus of
governments around the world, but especially in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the European Union.' Notwithstanding the
complexity and profusion of government publications on the topic,
the roots of the global financial crisis are elementary: consumers, in
mass, borrowed in excess of what they could afford, leading to
defaults in mass, which blew crippling holes in the balance sheets of
financial institutions, (i.e. banks), which starved the economy of
cash.6 The massive failure in the consumer credit market, which
precipitated the crisis, has brought the issue of consumer financial
protection to the forefront in the United States and United Kingdom
that led to the creation of a government agency devoted solely
thereto.7 In addition, the fifty American states and the European
Union stand to have a lager role in the promulgation of consumer
financial regulations.8  These developments alone signal a coming
4. Id. at xvii. (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., id. at xv ; FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER
REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS, (2009),
(U.K.); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FROM FINANCIAL CRISIS TO RECOVERY: A
EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, Communication from the Commission
(2008). (E.U.).
6. The mechanics of the crisis are, of course, much more complex and will be
discussed in greater detail below. Still, the crisis is essentially a magnified
example of what happens to a lender who issues a bad loan, absent a government
bail-out.
7. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (establishing the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection); HM TREASURY, A NEWAPPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION:
CONSULTATION ON REFORMING THE CONSUMER CREDIT REGIME HM TREASURY,
(Dec. 2010) (discussing the creation of the Consumer Protection and Markets
Authority), available at http://www,hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/consult.consumer.credit211210.pdf.
8. In addition and as explained below, the 50 states will also have increased
enforcement powers.
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wave of reform, but seen in light of their mandate to make right the
global financial crisis, it suggest that these changes to regulatory
structure will produce massive substantive changes and force banks
to cope with once unthinkable government intervention.
This Comment will explore the structural changes in regulation
concerning consumer financial protection in the United States, the
European Union, and the United Kingdom.' The comment will
discuss the connection between the global financial crisis and
consumer financial protection in order to justify, or at least provide a
basis for, these regulatory changes in consumer financial protection.' 0
From this, two structural changes will be discussed: the emergence of
regulators focused on financial consumer protection and independent
from other financial regulators" and multi-level governmental
regulations.' 2 An analysis of the evolving regulatory regimes in
Europe and America will illustrate how these structural changes will
have profound consequences for financial institutions, regulators, and
lawyers.
Consumer financial protection is used as an umbrella term to
describe laws and regulations designed to prevent individual
borrowers from taking on excessive risk.' 3 In practice, consumer
financial protection regulators aim to curb borrowers from acquiring
loans that are unfair or deceptive, which collectively manifest into a
market failure.14 Driven by economic and social concerns, both the
United Kingdom and United States make use of consumer financial
protection laws." The rule making and enforcement capacity of
consumer financial protection regulators have been criticized as
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. For example, the Federal Reserve in the U.S. and Bank of England in the
U.K.
12. In the case of the U.K., the level issue is discussed in relation to the
European Unions while in the U.S. the issue is between the federal and state
governments.
13. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three
Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255
(2002) (arguing that predatory lending represents a market failure).
15. E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2008) (U.S); Financial
Services Act 2010, §§ 2 §§ 6A(2), FSMA (2000) (U.K.).
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tepid: however, because they have traditionally been under the
auspices of bank regulators, who are focused on the soundness of the
overall financial service sector.16 In the United States, individual
state laws on consumer financial protection have been preempted"
by federal laws resulting in weaker regulations." Legislation passed
in response to the financial crisis has confronted both these issues,
raising the prospects of a more robust consumer financial protection.
A focus on regulation in the United Kingdom and United States,
in particular, on the topic of consumer financial protection, is
uniquely appropriate. On the consumer side, household borrowing
has significantly increased in both countries in recent years leaving
households highly leveraged.' 9 With respect to lenders, both
countries have prominent and vital financial service sectors centered
on two of the world's greatest financial centers in New York and
London. 20  Further, and as the crisis itself demonstrates, the myriad
of regulatory regimes around the world can not be understood in
isolation, but rather as co-dependent institutions participating in one
economy dominated by global finance and international trade.21
16. Adam Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets
Upstream, 19 (Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No.
1259406, 2008) ("[T]he safety-and-soundness mission is incompatible with
consumer protection because practices that might be profitable and thus increase
banks' safety-and-soundness might also be abusive and unfair to consumers").
17. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 14 (2007).
18. The net result of preemption was essentially near total deregulation
because federal regulators did not act to replace state law. Elizabeth R. Shilitz, The
Paradox of the Global and the Local in the Financial Crisis of 2008, 26 J. L. &
RELIGION 173, 182-83 (2011).
19. Debt and Deleveraging: The Global Credit Bubble and Its Economic
Consequences, McKinsey Global Institute (Jan. 2010),
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/freepass.pdfs/debtand
_deleveraging/debt and deleveragingfull report.pdf.
20. New York and London have been ranked as the joint-top global financial
centers. London and New York Tied as Top Financial Centres, BBC NEWS , (Mar.
12, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8563525.stm.
21. "[F]inancial markets are global in scope, therefore, intensified international
cooperation among regulators and strengthening of international standards . . . is
necessary to protect against adverse cross-border, regional and global
developments affecting international financial stability." The Group of Twenty (G-
20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Declaration from the Summit
on Financial Markets and World Economy, (Nov. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.g20.org/documents/g20 summit-declaration.pdf.
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Part III of this Comment provides an overview of the global
financial crisis emphasizing the increased availability of credit and
the American mortgage crisis. Part IV addresses the principles of
consumer financial protection. Part V utilizes these principles and
frames the crisis as a market failure in the consumer credit market.
Part VI addresses reform legislation in the United States and the
return of state authority through the curbing of federal preemption.
Part VII discusses the European Union's renewed emphasis on
regulating consumer financial protection under the theory of
regulatory harmonization. Part VIII discusses financial regulation in
the United Kingdom, where the new government has embarked on a
mission to abolish the eminent Financial Service Authority, and
replace it in part, by a regulator focused on the conduct of financial
institutions.
III. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Ben S. Bernanke, who, as Chairman of the United States Federal
Reserve Bank has been central and lasting figure in the response to
the global financial crisis, describes recent events as such:
This is a momentous time. During the past two and a
half years, our nation has endured the worst global
financial crisis since the Great Depression, a crisis
that in turn helped cause a deep recession both here
and abroad. During some of the worst phases of the
crisis, a new depression seemed a real possibility. 22
This Section provides a sketch of the themes and events that
constitute the global financial crisis. While specific attention is given
to developments in the United States and the United Kingdom, the
crisis can only be understood as global in scope. 2 The discussion is
22. Ben S. Bernanke Chairman, Fed. Res., Speech At the Dallas Regional
Chamber: "Economic Challenges: Past, Present, and Future." (Apr. 7, 2010)
Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Speech at the Labor Party
Conference (Sep. 29, 2009), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article13841.html .
23. "[I]t is impossible to understand this crisis without reference to the global
imbalances in trade and capital flows that began in the latter half of the 1990s."
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divided into three consequent phases: 1) the credit expansion that
infused the global economy at the turn of the century, 2) the collapse
of the American housing market and the consequent tidal wave of
mortgage delinquencies, referred to as the "mortgage crisis," and 3)
the global credit squeeze that threatened to usher in a second great
depression.
A. The Credit Glut
In the decade that preceded the crisis, the availability of
consumer credit grew rapidly.24  Referred to as the "Great
Moderation" in the United States and as the "Great Stability" in the
United Kingdom, the period was characterized by low inflation, low
interest rates, and steady economic growth.25 These conditions
encouraged banks to lend and consumers to borrow.26 The savings
ratio among Americans fell from 6% of disposable income to below
1% and the total debt-to-disposable income ratio rose from 75% to
120%.27 Consumers increasingly relied on debt, believing that cheap
credit would always be available and that the economy would
continue to flourish.28 The proliferation of debt assured that when
the inevitable downturn came consumers would be forced survive
while being highly leveraged. 29
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res., Speech at the Council on Foreign
Relations: Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk (Mar. 10, 2009).
24. Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007-2008: A Discussion of the
Background, Market Reactions, and Policy Responses, 90(5) FED. RESERVE BANK
of ST. Louis REV. 531, 533-35 (Sep. 2008).
25. Id. at 533. Exporter nations like China sought to build up large foreign cash
reserves placing a high demand on strong currencies and permitting interest rates to
stay low in many developed nations because of the influx in capital. Id. at 533-34.
26. Id. at 533.
27. Id. at 534. The United Kingdom shows a similar patterns in saving and
debt-to-
income ratios. Id. (Can't fix the spacing here, might be done after all the
changes do to this page, Helen)
28. These conditions have led many to believe that the crisis that followed was
"an accident waiting and ready to happen." A.E. Goodhart, The Background to the
2007 Financial Crisis, 4 J INTL ECON & ECON POLICY 331, 331-40 (2008).
29. Economic recovery would be hindered as holders of debt engaged in the
painful process of deleveraging, depressing both consumer spending and job
growth. McKinsey Global Institute, Debt and Deleveraging: The Global Credit
219Spring 2011 A Specter is Haunting the Financial Industry
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B. The Mortgage Crisis
The phenomenon discussed above was on full display in the
American housing market. As housing prices began to rise in the
early 2000s, homeowners could take advantage of low interest rates
and gain access the growing equity in their property by obtaining a
mortgage loan.30 Many Americans chose to cash out, which provided
an immediate benefit to the economy, by increasing consumer
spending, but also greatly increased individual debt levels and
exposure to risk.31 As housing prices began to slide at the end of
2006 and as the United States entered into a recession, mortgage
delinquencies rose with ever increasing speed.32 Culminating with
historic highs in 2008, the tidal wave of defaults dealt the economy a
devastating blow while further depressing property values and
leaving many borrowers owing more on their home than it was
worth.33
Leading up to the mortgage crisis, home loans in the United
Bubble and Its Economic Consequences, January 2010. Saddled with debt,
consumers are forced to spend a large percentage of their income on payments to
bring down the amount of their debt, this process, referred to as deleveraging,
limits the amount of money consumers can spend in the market making economic
recovery more difficult. Id.
30. Mizen, supra note 24, at 534-35. See generally Teresa A. Sullivan, Less
Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary
Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REv. 213, 229-32 (2006) (discussing
the rising levels of consumer debt).
31. In addition to the transactional cost associated with taking out a home loan,
the property also becomes subject to the possibility of foreclosure.
32. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: The Mortgage Crisis, (Apr. 7, 2010,)
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn-media/fcic-reports/2010-0407-
PSR_:TheMortgageCrisis.pdf. The rate of mortgage delinquency varied greatly
during the mortgage crisis, with California, Arizona, Nevada, and Florida
experiencing rate of 16%, nearly double the seen in other areas of the country. Id.
33. Id. A standard model of mortgage default is known as the double-trigger
model, where borrowers default on a mortgage when they have both negative
equity, because they owe more on the house than it is worth, and they experience
some sort of income shock, such as job loss, that makes it difficult to continue
making payments on the mortgage. Id. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
point to rising employment during the Mortgage Crisis as the possible economic
shock brining about the increase in default. Id.
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States became highly securitized.34 Investors were sold the rights to
the principal and interest payments on home loans were pooled
together and reoffered as mortgage-backed-securities. 3 5  These
securities were held as assets by financial institutions around the
world and provided the principle funding for the housing finance
systems.36 Claims in mortgage-backed-securities by foreign banks
from five major advanced countries increased from $6.3 trillion in
2000 to $22 trillion by June 2008.37 Originally valued with an AAA
ranking, this glut of assets was subjected to severe devaluation in the
wake of the mortgage crisis as anticipated revenue became
unrealizable. 38 Banks all over the world, already highly leveraged as
a result of the credit expansion, suffered a disabling attack on their
solvency.39
As it became clear that the mortgage-backed-securities were far
more risk prone than their original valuation suggested, those
financial institutions, which held significant stakes therein, were
forced to reconsider their balance sheets, realizing a great increase in
their liabilities.40 Like any lender who made a habit of relying on
34. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT,
SECURITIZATION AND THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, April 7, 2010, http://fcic.gov/reports/
("By 1998, 64 percent of originated mortgage loans were sold by originators to
large financial institutions that package bundles of mortgages and sell the right to
receive borrowers' payments of principal and interest directly to investors.").
35. Freddie Mac spearheaded the securitization movement in the 1970s in an
effort to increase the amount of available mortgage capital. See LELAND C.
BRENDSEL, SECURITIZATION's ROLE IN HOUSING FINANCE: THE SPECIAL
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, IN A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 172 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996).
36. See fn 34. Banks outside the U.S. included in the top 25 holders of
mortgage backed securities include Deutsche Bank of Germany, Credit Suisse and
UBS of Switzerland, Barclays and HSBC of the United Kingdom and Nomura of
Japan. Id.
37. Oliver Blanchard, The Crisis: Basic Mechanisms and Appropriate Policies,
IMF Working Paper No. 09/80, 2009. One of the early stories of the crisis was the
surprisingly large exposure of some regional German banks to U.S. subprime loans.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. For example, in 2006, the value of the off-balance sheet assets of
Citigroup, $2.1 trillion, exceeded the value of the assets on the balance sheet, $1.8
trillion. Id.
40. See Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, FORTUNE
MAGAZINE(Mar. 31, 2008),
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risky loans, banks which stood at the center of the global capital
market faced the prospect of not being able to pay their bills or return
their deposits.4 1
In the fall of 2008, fears of a second Great Depression were
rampant as the prospect of a bank failures spread throughout the
greater economy.42 This fear reached its zenith with the collapse, and
subsequent bankruptcy, of the prominent investment bank, Lehman
Brothers, an occurrence widely assumed to be unthinkable.43 Those
banks sound enough to not be struggling for survival ceased to lend
money in order to enable themselves to manage their increased
liabilities and/or to avoid the risk of further exposing themselves to
defaults.44 As lending terminated on a massive scale and capital was
withdrawn from markets, the economy was starved of its life-line and
governments were forced to supplement market capital with public
tax dollars in order to keep the economy afloat.45
IV. PRINCIPLES OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
As made apparent by the discussion above, the mass weight of
defaults that plagued the American housing market from 2006 until
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boyd_bear.fortune/
(describing how the investment bank and Wall Street legend Bear Steams collapsed
as a result of loss liquidity in the market for subprime loan).
41. See Northern Rock: Lessons from the Fall, THE ECONOMIST(Oct. 18th,
2007,) http://www.economist.com/node/9988865 (describing British banking giant
Northern Rock road to insolvency).
42. Blanchard, supra note 37, at 15. The crisis led to an increase in
counterparty risk between banks, i.e., to an increase in the perceived probability
that a bank borrowing from another bank may not be able to repay. Id.
43. Id. at 12-13. Lehman Brothers was a well-known and large bank
systematically intertwined with banks and corporations around the world and
financial markets, its very public failure not only froze claims against it but greatly
increased the rate at which capital was pulled from the market. Id.
44. Id. at 14. Correspondingly, investors reacted by pulling from their
investment from capital causing stock markets around the world to drop
precipitously. Id at 15.
45. The U.S. Troubled Asset Relief Program, commonly referred to as TARP
or the "Wall Street Bailout." See Emergency Economic Stabilization - Energy
Improvement and Extension - Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax
Relief, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 2008 HR 1424, (allows the Department of the
Treasury to purchase or insure up to $700 Billion of "troubled assets," mainly
mortgage backed securities).
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the present played a central role in the crisis.46 While the nature of
the problem that gave rise to the mortgage crisis is far from settled,
this comment argues, that the problem should be understood as a
market failure in the consumer financial product market that could
have been prevented through government regulation.47 The Section
begins by discussing the principles of consumer financial protection
and the problems that those principles aim to address.
Regulations described as consumer financial protection aim to
prevent a borrower from incurring excessive risk when acquiring a
consumer credit product.48 Such laws are intended to curb lending
practices that are unfair, abusive, or predatory, and are premised on
efficiency grounds being necessary due to a market failure.49 The
market failure implicated is often described as information
asymmetry, where a party to a transaction is without the information
necessary to act as a rational actor in the market.o
Consumer financial protections are not dissimilar from
regulations promulgated by other governmental agencies, such as the
Federal Drug Administration. Consumer credit products, like
46. See Ben S. Bernanke Chairman, Fed. Res., Speech at the Federal Reserve
Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets in Washington D.C.: Housing,
Mortgage Markets, and Foreclosures (Dec. 4, 2008), (stating that "housing finance
played a central role in precipitating the current crisis").
47. See Timothy Geithner, Treasury Secretary, Written Testimony House
Committee on Financial Services, March 23, 2010:
The housing finance system clearly cannot continue to operate as it
has in the past. A broad reform process of the housing finance system
must be undertaken to achieve comprehensive and effective reform that
delivers a more stable housing market with stronger regulation, more
effective consumer protections and a clearer role of government with less
risk bome by the American taxpayer. (emphasis added).
48. See Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 2-4.
49. E.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:
The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255 (2002)
(arguing that predatory lending represents a market failure).
50. Oren Bar-Gill and Warren, supra note 13, at 2. For example, it has been
argued that the Truth and Lending Act in the United States was intended to address
information asymmetries that prevented consumers from reading the terms of loans
and, by extension, the risks. Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth,
the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in
Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 181-82 (2008).
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prescription drugs, pose risks."' Of course, credit products play a
crucial and positive role in modem economies by providing
consumers with greater value and providing more job opportunities.52
Ideally, credit products are offered in a free market through a
contractual relationship between informed and rational parties.53 In
practice, however, this is not always the case.54 For example, an
intelligent consumer might engage in a contract because the benefits
outweigh the perceived risk, as opposed to the actual risks.55
One may contend that the risks of credit products will drive
consumers to educate themselves in order to avoid unfavorable deals.
However, consumers are often prevented from attainting the
understanding necessary to make a rational decision because the cost
of attainting the information is too high.5 6 The average consumer,
who looks at a standard form contract to acquire a credit card might
fail to fully understand the implications of penalty fee terms and will
51. Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 3. ("Credit cards, subprime
mortgages, and payday loans can lead to financial distress, bankruptcy, and
foreclosure.").
52. See id. at 5. ("Credit can also provide a critical safety net, permitting
families to borrow against a better tomorrow if they suffer job layoffs, medical
problems, or family breakups today.").
53. Id. This ideal is based upon the freedom-of-contract principle where faith
in the value of free markets enhances consumer and social welfare. Id at 8.
("Moreover, informed rational consumers will minimize product risk by taking
optimal care. And a market populated by informed rational consumers will force
manufacturers and issuers to offer a reasonable level of product risk by optimally
designing their products.") (citing STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW ch. 3 (1987) (discussing cases limited to average risk)).
54. When assumptions that drive the free market break down the freedom-of-
contract principle can act as "a tool used by more sophisticated parties to take
consumers' money without giving value in return." Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra
note 13, at 7.
55. Steven Shavell, supra note 53, at 52-53. For example, "An imperfectly
rational consumer might underestimate the likelihood of a penalty-triggering event.
This consumer, even if she is aware of the high penalties, will underestimate the
risk associated with high penalties. Consequently, this consumer might obtain a
credit card that is not welfare maximizing for her." Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra
note 13, at 9.
56. Oren Bar-Gill &Warren, supra note 13, at 13. ("This is especially true with
respect to modem consumer credit products. The standard credit card or mortgage
contract has gotten longer and more difficult to read, and comparison among such
contracts is challenging even for a professional.").
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not invest the time to do so because he or she will assume that other
consumers are informed and an unfair product would not be
offered. In other words, the consumer trusts the market to asses the
product in light of its popularity and complexity.
Providers of credit are unlikely to significantly help consumers
better understand the product being offered. Further, lenders are
hesitant to offer lower risk products, and advertise them as such for
fear that competitors will do the same, negating any benefit.59 There
is also evidence that demonstrates that lenders are unable to educate
consumers on how their products are safer.6 0  Such circumstances,
where the market assumption of the rational decision-maker fails for
lack of attainable information, constitute a market failure that needs
to be regulated by the government in order for the market to operate
more efficiently.6'
57. Id. Consumer Reports, often very helpful with respect to physical product,
are of limited usefulness in the field of credit product because the complexity,
fluidity, and diversity of credit products. Id. at 7.
58. Shocking, I know, but sometimes a lender can educate a borrower by
explaining how the product they offer is better then those offered by competitors;
in such a case the seller has an incentive to educate the consumer. Id.
59. For example, if a bank wanted to issue credit cards without a universal-
default clause, it would have to spend capital advertising the fact in order to modify
consumer expectations and educate them on the risks of a universal default
provision; and provided they are successful, other issuers would also offer such
cards, quickly competing away any potential return on the banks advertising
investment. Id.
60. Id. at 8. For example, when Citibank publicly announced to great praise
that they were no longer to offer one of the most dangerous practices associated
with credit cards, universal default, they began renewed the practices after only
two years. Id. The chief administrative officer for Citigroup's credit card unit
explained, "[w]e hoped and expected that these two points of differentiation would
lead customers to vote with their feet. . . . We have been disappointed with the
results we have seen so far." Id. at 20. (citing Eric Dash, Citigroup Considers
Repealing a Pledge, and the Slogan with It, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at C4
(quoting John P. Carey, Chief Admin. Officer, Citibank Credit Card Unit)).
61. While this discussion has been mostly theoretical, empirical observations
drive home the point that far too many consumers, for whatever reason, do not
understand consumer credit products. A 2006 study by the United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that "many [credit card holders]
failed to understand key terms or conditions that could affect their cost, including
when they would be charged for late payments or what actions could cause issuers
to raise rates." U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-929, CREDIT
CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE
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The conceptual framework of a failed consumer credit market is
illustrated through empirical evidence in the mortgage industry,
where both complexity and risk are highest among consumer credit
products. For example, many consumers do not understand, or
recognize, key terms in their mortgage contract. 62 A study by the
Federal Reserve Board found those with an adjustable-rate mortgages
exhibit alarming confusion over the operations of that credit
product. 6 3 Further, many consumers are unaware of the relationship
between interest rates established by central banks and the adjustable
rate of their mortgage.64 Such misunderstandings pose a heightened
danger when what is at stake is the individual's home.
The harm posed by failures in the consumer credit market is
severe and multi-dimensional. Harm done to the individual
consumer is easy to identify; an individual obtaining a dangerous
consumer product, of which he has inadequate knowledge, can face a
total loss of savings, loss of a home, higher cost of insurance, low-
credit score, and bleak retirement, all of which can be tantamount to a
broken life.65 The harm, however, is not limited to the individual but
poses a systematic threat to the wider economy. Moreover, a failure
in the credit market exacerbates already present social inequalities.
The different costs born by mistaken consumers of credit process
EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS, 6 (2006) (utilizing evidence based on
interviews consumers).
62. Macro Int'l, Inc., Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending
Disclosures, Federal Reserve ii-x(2007),http://
www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/regulationz/20070523/Execsummary.pdf
63. See Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House
Values and Mortgage Terms? 26-27, FED. RES. BD. OF GOVERNORS, FIN. & ECON.
DISCUSSION SERIES (Paper No. 2006-03, 2006,) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/200603/200603pap.pdf (stating that
"[b]orrowers with less income or education seem especially likely not to know their
mortgage terms").
64. Id.; see also David Miles, THE UK MORTGAGE MARKET: TAKING A
LONGER-TERM VIEW: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 97 (2004)
(discussing borrowers' poor understanding of interest-rate risks).
65. On the effect of dangerous mortgage products, see, for example, Oren Bar-
Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 5 n.3 (quoting JOINT ECON. COMM., 2007 JOINT
ECONOMIC REPORT 37-44), stating that, a subprime foreclosure results in 'loss of a
stable living place and significant portion of wealth,' 'create[s] possible tax
liabilities,' and 'reduces the homeowner's credit rating, creating barriers to future
home purchases and even rentals.'
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are numerous and very costly, not just to the individual, but, in the
aggregate, to society.66 1.4 million people or 35% of consumers of
the product, fail each year to switch credit cards after the introductory
period and face a $250 fee, which implies an aggregate cost of $350
million dollars a year for a single obscure mistake.67 Even if it were
possible to calculate and determine the cost of all such mistakes
associated with consumer product, that amount would not take into
account the human cost of financial distress. 6 8
Effects of market failures that go beyond the individual are
termed negative externalities. Two such effects created by the failure
in the consumer credit market are the cost of distress to others and
distortion in the market.69 Distress is felt primarily by immediate
family members.70 Children and elderly individuals living with
family can be gravely affected when their households face financial
distress.7 The failure also distorts the market by artificially raising
the demand for products with underestimated risks.72 The skew in
favor of demand will encourage the market to reallocate resources
accordingly, but the underlying mistake in the demand will make the
shift inefficient.73 Such negative externalities increase costs for
66. Examples of cost associated with misinformation of consumer product
include: penalty fees, increased rates after introductory phases, over draft charges
and the cost of a lower credit score.
67. Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 57.
68. Id. at 58.
69. Id. at 58-64.
70. In 2001, 1.9 million children and elderly persons, who had no direct
responsibility for bills, lived in households facing bankruptcy. Elizabeth Warren,
Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1003, 1010 fig.1 (2002).
71. See, e.g., Susan E. Mayer, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: FAMILY INCOME
AND CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES, 76-77 (1997) (finding that children whose parents
experienced a drop in income of 35% over two years were more likely to
experience lower test scores and behavior problems in the classroom); Oren Bar-
Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 60 (citing Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th CONG. 25 (Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Elizabeth
Warren) (stating that 2 ,000 households filing for bankruptcy in 2001 indicated
they had to move an elderly relative to a cheaper care facility in order to deal with
their financial problems)).
72. Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 62-63.
73. This point will be developed below in the discussion regarding the
mortgage crisis.
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informed and uninformed consumers alike.74
The pervasiveness of negative externalities should not suggest
that everyone shares equally in the burden posed by failures in the
consumer credit market. To the contrary, wealthy and educated
individuals largely escape the dangers of credit products.75
Moreover, evidence shows that exposure to the risk of credit product
is not evenly distributed among races and other socioeconomic
groups.76 One reason for this discrepancy is that those with more
education and who are better off financially are aided by the
complexity of credit product while those less educated and facing
financial difficulty are hindered. Still, as the recent crisis
demonstrates sometimes even the smartest guy in the room does not
understand what he is buying and this mistake can lead to a market
failure so massive as to have an impact on all socio-economic groups.
V. THE CRISIS AS A MARKET FAILURE IN THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY
The global financial crisis was preceded by a tidal wave of
defaults in the American mortgage market that left financial
institutions the world over short of the cash needed to keep the
economy moving.7 8  The primary driver behind this phenomenon
74. Id. at 63-64 ("The higher prices that consumers must pay for safe products
represent another cost of unsafe products.").
75. A lower-middle class family who experiences an unexpected rate increase
on their credit card to 29.99% and takes out an ill-advised second mortgage can be
subject to severe financial hardship with little possibility of recovery. Id. at 69.
76. Id. at. 64-69; see also U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 35 (2000),
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (noting that
"black borrowers accounted for 19% of all subprime refinance loans but only 5
percent of overall refinance mortgages"); John Leland, Baltimore Finds Subprime
Crisis Snags Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at Al (citing a 2006 survey by
Prudential Financial).
77. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707, 725-27 (2006)
(discussing how the increased complexity of loan structuring can help or hurt
consumers depending on their sophistication).
78. The fact that banks in Dilsseldorf, Germany were exposed to the subprime
market to the tone of billions under the impression such investments were AAA
rated and that financial intuitions around the world were so leveraged that they
were unable to deal with the shock dealt by the subprime defaults are outside the
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was the subprime mortgage loan, a credit product designed primarily
for lower income borrowers. While one can not dismiss the element
of individual irresponsibility, where borrowers and lenders alike
made poor risk assessments leading to poor financial outcomes, the
massive scale of defaults and the disabling blow to the global
economy make the need for reform more than apparent.79  This
Section argues that product complexity, securitization, and moral
hazard within the market for subprime loans conspired to misinform
consumers and artificially inflate demand for subprime mortgages.o
The prevalence of subprime loans in the mortgage market sharply
increased over the past decade.81 As discussed above, a boom in the
mortgage industry coincided with the increased availability of credit
throughout the economy. Generally, subprime mortgages offer risk
prone borrowers a loan with significantly higher upfront costs, fees
and interest rate.82 In order to make such a product marketable in
spite of the increased costs, it is offered along with appealing, yet
complex, rate and payment features that would catch the eyes of
consumers and downplay the associated risks. 83 For example, the
adjustable rates of subprime loans offer a borrower a low "teaser"
rate which would convert into a floating rate after a period of time.84
scope of this comment but represent two additional critical elements contributing to
the global financial crisis. See Stefan Theil, The Germans Are Toxic Too,
NEWSWEEK (Jun. 12, 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/2009/06/l 1/the-germans-
are-toxic-too.html.
79. And by extension, a failure of American regulators.
80. The subprime mortgage market and its harmful effects have been classified
by some as the result predatory lending. See Engel and McCoy, supra note 49, (for
a discussion of the sub-prime mortgage market leading up to the crisis).
81. See Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The
Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis
REv. 31, 36-40 (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at http://
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf.
82. Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 81, at 32. Such costs
include: upfront costs including application fees, appraisal fees, and other fees
associated with originating a mortgage, continuing costs including mortgage
insurance payments, principle and interest payments, late fees and fines for
delinquent payments, and fees levied by a locality. Id.
83. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 123, 134 (stating the two defining
features of subprime mortgage contracts are cost deferral and complexity in terms).
84. Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-based
Pricing, 44 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 144 (2007); see also David Miles, THE UK
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When approached with an offer to mortgage their property,
borrowers were enticed by a lump-sum of money and the prospect of
a low monthly rate.8 5
Efforts to make subprime mortgages more attractive were very
successful as approximately half of those who were issued a
subprime loan could have qualified for a lower interest loan. 86 The
high proportion of people taking out less favorable and high-cost
loans indicates the strong likelihood that consumers were not fully
aware of the risky laden terms of the subprime loan.8 ' A typical
consumer had little to no chance of understanding or comparing the
complex subprime products.8 8 This apparent inability of consumers
MORTGAGE MARKET: TAKING A LONGER-TERM VIEW, INTERIM REPORT:
INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND PRICING §3 (2003) (concluding, based on an
analysis of the UK mortgage market, that lenders can offer attractive teaser rates
only because many consumers fail to refinance).
85. Among subprime loans, over half were for cash-out refinancing, while just
over one-third were for a home purchase. Chomsisengphet, Souphala and
Pennington-Cross, Anthony, The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market,
FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV., (Jan./Feb. 2006), 88(1). 41. In cashing in on
their home's value, a great number of borrowers ignored the risks of increased
leverage, fees, and changing interest rates. See generally Lee Anne Fennell,
Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008) (discussing effects of
behavioral biases on real estate investments); Lauren E. Willis, Decision making
and the Limits ofDisclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L.
REV. 707, 754-84 (2006) (discussing behavioral biases afflicting mortgage
borrowers).
86. See Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 38-39 (citing Lew
Sichelman, Community Group Claims CitiFinancial Still Predatory, ORIGINATION
NEWS, Jan. 2002, at 25) (reporting 40%) (citing James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri,
PREDATORY LENDING: AN OVERVIEW, IN FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED
COMMUNITIES: IssuEs AND ANSWERS 31, 37 (Fannie Mae Found. ed., 2001)
(reporting 35-50%) (citing Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps
Even Very Credit Worthy: As Housing Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a
Broader Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at Al (reporting 55%)).
87. Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 39. See also Ren S. Essene &
William Apgar, Understanding Mortgage Market Behavior: Creating Good
Mortgage Options for All Americans, 2, JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES, HARVARD
UNIv. (2007), available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/mm07-
1_mortgage_market behavior.pdf (showing borrower and loan specific factors can
not explain the prevalence of subprime loans).
88. Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 39-40. See also Willis, supra
note 77, at 726-27, (arguing that different mortgage products for borrowers in
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to understand the fundamental information regarding a subprime loan
occurred in an aggressive lending market environment fueled by the
effects of securitization and the moral hazard it produced.
Securitization, discussed above, refers to the conversion of many
home mortgages into securities backed by collateral in the form of
pooled loans.89 The process has dramatically changed the business of
home finance allowing originators, or those who first make the loan,
to sell the loan on the secondary market to financial institutions as a
consistent source of capital. 90 Originators utilize brokers to market
the mortgage product to borrowers, assess risk and arrange for
financing.91 Based on the size of the loan, brokers collect fees from
both the originator and borrower. 92  This incentive structure was
created by securitization, and it encouraged originators and brokers to
expand the market for mortgages to include riskier borrowers.9 3
The persistent rise in the property market and low interest rates
that characterized the years before the crisis fostered great demand
for the mortgage backed securities. 94 By extension, this made the
business of originators and brokers more profitable, which perversely
translated into greater demand for subprime mortgage loans. 95 The
similar financial situations create significant barriers to meaningful consumer
participation in an efficient mortgage market).
89. See Tamar Frankel, SECURITIZATION: ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES AND
STRUCTURED FINANCING, IN FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE FOR
LAWYERS 4-2 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 1999).
90. See Leland Brandsel, SECURITIZATIONS ROLE IN HOUSING FINANCE: THE
SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, IN A PRIMER
ON SECURITIZATION 24 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996)
(explaining the function of originators has more simplified and competitive with
the advent of securitization).
91. See DEPARTMENTS OF THE TREASURY AND HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, at 37-40 (June
20, 2000).
92. See id. at 40; Cathy L. Mansfield, The Road to Subprime 'HEL' was Paved
with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home
Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 534 (2000).
93. Just ask yourself: In the past ten years how many phone calls have you
received during dinner where you were asked to refinance your house?
94. E.g., Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, YALE ICF WORKING PAPER, No.
08-25, 2 Sept. 30,2008, 5-6, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1276047.
95. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2039, 137 (2007)
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effects of this chain of demand recycled back into higher property
values and increased demand for mortgage backed securities.96
Securitization, combined with cheap credit and the robust housing
property market, led brokers and originators to increasingly push
subprime loans empowered by the market's mind-boggling
perception of demand. 97
The fervent market conditions exposed another consequence of
securitization, the development of moral hazard. The concept of
moral hazard refers to the dislocation of risk within a market, where a
party has the power and incentive to take risks without being fully
exposed thereto.98 The principle assumes unknown risk because the
transaction is carried out by an agent with conflicting incentives, the
assessment of risk being removed from the model of rational decision
making. 99
In the market for subprime loans, brokers and originators had a
financial incentive to sell as big a loan as possible. Through the
process of selling that loan onto the secondary market, the sellers of
the loan were able to escape, or insulate themselves from risk.'
(showing that excess demand by investors for asset-backed securities led to
additional subprime securitizations).
96. See Robert J. Shiller, Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and
Home Ownership, YALE ECON. DEP'T WORKING PAPER, No. 28, 2007), available at
http:// papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=1017546 (explaining how
housing prices increased from psychological feedback mechanism where increasing
asset prices lured investors and drove a speculative bubble).
97. While fraudulent practices are outside the scope of this comment, it has
been argued that these conditions created an environment ripe for predatory
lending. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance ofPredatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039, 137 (2007).
98. WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, available at http://www.websters-
dictionary-online.org/definitions/Moral Hazard, (defining moral hazard as the lack
of any incentive to guard against a risk when you are protected against it). The
terms has its origins in the insurance industry occurring when the behavior of the
insured party changes in a way that raises costs for the insurer, since the insured
party no longer bears the full costs of that behavior. See generally Tom Baker, On
the Genealogy ofMoral hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 237 (1996).
99. David P. Baron & David Besanko, The Rand Journal of Economics,
Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in
Procurement Contracts, 18-4, at 509-32 (Winter 1987.
100. Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the
Mortgage Meltdown, Remarks at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York,
N.Y. (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://
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Responding to a seemingly insatiable demand in the secondary
market, brokers became increasingly aggressive in marketing the
product while loosening underwriting standards.o' Illustrating the
effects of moral hazard, in the early 2000s stated income loans, once
rarely used as a method to verify income, went into the
mainstream.' 02 This policy allowed mortgage brokers to make loans
and qualify borrowers based on the unverified statements of
borrowers regarding their income and assets.' 03
The factors discussed above compounded as they came together
to create an perversely inflated market for subprime mortgages: a
consumer credit product that was dangerous to consumers, prone to
misunderstanding and executed with increasingly less underwriting
standards. This massive market failure occurred not only at a time
when credit was being made increasingly available, but when the
traditional powers vested with the responsibility to regulate consumer
financial products were eroding in the United States. This
development will be discussed in the next Section, along with the
legislation passed to stem it and the parallel debate in the United
Kingdom.
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080229a.htm (discussing
incentive problems created by "originate-to-distribute" model).
101. Not only did financial institutions profit from buy the mortgage backed
securities, but were under the impression that the division, pooling and leveling of
the loans insulated the securities from the risk of default. See Ronald J. Gilson &
Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs,
and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 231 (2008) (describing risk
spreading functions of the collateralized debt obligation, the type of securitization
used in the subprime mortgage market).
102. Charles W. Murdock, Why Not Tell the Truth?: Deceptive Practices and
the Economic Meltdown, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 801, 843 (2010). .See also Mark
Zandi, Financial Shock: A 360 Look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion, and
How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis 17 (FT Press 2009) (2008) (reporting the
nick name given to stated income loan with the mortgage industry: liar loans).
103. Murdock, supra note 102, at 843-44. Traditionally, such verifications
methods were utilized to serve professionals and small business owners who lacked
W-2 forms to verify income. Id.
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VI. DEREGULATION, DODD-FRANK, AND TURNING THE TIDE OF
PREEMPTION
The following two Sections discuss the evolving regulatory
structures, which are concerned with consumer financial protection
with respect to rule-making authority at different governmental
levels. In the United States, this involves a discussion of state versus
federal power.'04 In the United Kingdom, this means a discussion of
the United Kingdom's national power versus the super-national
power of the European Union.105  On both sides of the Atlantic,
change has been initiated, in regimes already in influx, in the wake of
the global financial crisis. As such, the prospect of a myriad of
diverting regulatory propagation threatens to undermine the gains of
the financial industry in creating harmonization among government
financial regulations.
A. Deregulation Through Preemption in the United States
A financial institution within the United States' dual banking
system has the option of organizing itself under state or federal law,
for example, becoming one of the fifty states chartered banks or a
federally chartered bank.106 Notwithstanding, individual states once
104. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. const. art.
VI, cl. 2, permits a federal statute, to preempt state law.
105. The European Union is a novel political system created through a series
of treaties among twenty-seven nations in Europe, pursuant to which various
aspects of national sovereignty are ceded to the collective authority of the E.U., see
http://europa.eu/abc/european countries/eu members/index en.htm for a list of
the states the constitute the union. Three different government bodies execute
authority of the member states: The Council of the European Union, consisting of
the ministers from each of the member state; the European Parliament, directly
elected by and representing the people of the various member states; and the
European Commission, representing the common interests of the union. See Pascal
Fontaine, Europe in 12 Lessons 17-20 (B-1049 Brussels 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eulpublicationsibooklets/eu glance/60/en.pdf.
106. See Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and
Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More
Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 515, 515-16 (2007) (discussing the
emergence of the dual banking system in the U.S); Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual
Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3
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had considerable power to regulate both federal and outside state
banks through laws that protected consumers within their boarders.' 0 7
This traditional authority has largely evaporated, however, and has
been replaced by regulatory regimes that are mostly hollow of
comparable regulations.' 0 8  The destruction of state consumer
financial protection laws, culminating in the mid-2000s, began in the
late 1970s and was spearheaded by the United States Supreme
Court.109
In 1978, the Supreme Court held that provisions of the National
Bank Act" 0 gave banks the ability to "export" their home-state's
interest rate policy into states where they were conducting
business."' The scope of this ruling was greatly expanded in
subsequent cases to include a host of consumer financial protection
provisions on interest rates and related fees.1 2 The end result made
(1977) (discussing the different ways a bank was traditionally able to organize
itself).
107. See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever Expanding
Exportation Doctrine and its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L.
REv. 518, 525-33 (2004); see also William Eskridge, One Hundred Years of
Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and
Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv.
1083 (1984) (discussing the history of state usury laws).
108. Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 79-83.
109. Id. see also CREDIT CARD PRACTICES: CURRENT CONSUMER AND
REGULATORY ISSUES: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND CONSUMER CREDIT OF THE H. COMM. ON FINANCIAL SERVS.,
110th Cong. 70 (2007) (written testimony of Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of
Law, George Washington University Law School) (describing the effects of
Supreme Court jurisprudence on state consumer financial protection law).
110. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006).
111. See Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978) (affirming the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding that
the National Bank Act "authorizes a national bank based in one state to charge its
out-of-state credit-card customers an interest rate . . . allowed by its home state,
even though that rate is greater than that permitted by the state of the bank's
nonresident customers").
112. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1996)
(extending the holding in Marququtte to include any payment compensating a
creditor for an extension of credit, including numerical periodic rates, annual and
cash-advance fees, bad-check fees, overlimit fees, and late-payment fees); see also
Mark Furletti, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of State
Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards, 77 TEMPLE L. REv. 425, 426 (2004) (citing
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states powerless to protect their consumers because banks were given
the ability to base themselves in states with the most favorable
regulations, for example in South Dakota, and regulations can then be
exported to all other states where they do business." 3 These rulings,
in effect, greatly limited the power of states to engage in consumer
financial protection.114
Recently, more direct federal preemption has eliminated state
laws on consumer financial protection in areas far beyond interest
rates.' 15 In 2004, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency issued a
regulation that expanded the scope of federal preemption and
insulated all banks under the auspices of its charter from any state
laws that it determines will obstruct, impair, or condition a national
bank's ability to fully exercise its federally authorized powers in four
broadly-defined areas: real estate lending, lending not secured by real
estate, deposit-taking, and other operations." 6 This broad expansion
of federal authority, at the expense of state governments, has been
upheld by the Supreme Court."' These developments have led many
repeated rulings by various courts upholding federal regulators power to preempt
state law under the National Bank Act).
113. Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 80, 81 n. 262 ("South Dakota
enjoys tax revenues from banks that choose to locate in the state, while those banks
enjoy profits generated by interest rates charged to customers in California and
Massachusetts--profits that legislatures in California and Massachusetts specifically
prohibit. Banks in haven states impose costs that are borne largely by consumers in
other states.").
114. Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 79-83 (noting that state
interest rate and fee regulation is not preempted by federal regulation, "[r]ather, the
preemption follows from the federally defined rules applicable only to federally
chartered banks. Specifically, the [National Bank Act] rule that interstate lending is
subject to the laws of the state in which the lender is headquartered triggered
interstate regulatory competition to attract lenders, and this competition effectively
eliminated state-level price regulation").
115. Id. at 81-83.
116. Id. at 82-83 (citing 12 C.F.R. §§7.4008 (lending not secured by real
estate), 7.4007 (deposit-taking), 7.4009 (other "operations"), 34.4(a) (real estate
lending) (2008)).
117. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1564-65 (2007).
Further, even if the state law is not preempted, state enforcement is severely limited
by the OCC's "visitorial powers" giving the OCC exclusive power to enforce both
state and federal laws against national banks. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000; see also
Clearing House Ass'n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 120 (2d Cir. 2007) (validating the
"visitorial powers").
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to question if state consumer financial protection laws retain any
relevance." 8  Also, indicating a more favorable federal regulatory
environment is that over $1 trillion of banking assets have been
transferred into the federal banking system from the states."19
Thus, the federal preemption of state consumer financial
protection laws amounted to deregulation in two ways. First,
competition among the states for tax-revenue led to the roll back of
regulations in order to make respective state charters look more
attractive to banks.120 Second, there was direct preemption of state
laws by an underdeveloped and unprepared federal regulatory
regime.121 It is within this regulatory environment, that the excesses
of the subprime market were permitted, if not encouraged, to proceed
unchecked.122
B. Dodd-Frank Attempts to Revive State Regulators
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protect Act
("Dodd-Frank"), was signed into law by President Obama in July
2010 as a response to the global financial crisis.123 Dodd-Frank, in
118. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-387, 10-17, OCC
PREEMPTION RULES: OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY THE APPLICABILITY OF
STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06387.pdf (questioning the applicability of state
consumer protection laws in light of OCC preemption power).
119. Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 82-83.
120. Id. at 83.
121. Id. See also Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Paradox of the Global and Local in
the Financial Crisis of 2008: Applying the Lessons of Caritas in Veritate to the
Regulation of Consumer Credit in the United Stated and European Union, 26 J.L.
& RELIGION 173, 183 (2010-2011) ("Although the federalization of consumer
credit in the U.S. did entail substantive deregulation. . . . The deregulation occurred
because the federal government did not act to regulate the entities over which it had
gained exclusive jurisdiction.").
122. See Oren Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 83 ("By permitting the
states to compete for business by offering less and less consumer protection, the
regulation scheme starts to unravel. Moreover, federal regulations that preempt
state consumer protection without substituting other protection schemes create
large holes in the regulatory fabric that encourage lenders to use a national charter
to evade local protection. The combination not only leaves consumers with little
protection, it also creates structures in which the most aggressive lenders can
pursue their tactics with impunity.") (emphasis added).
123. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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creating the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection ("BCFP") with
a mandate to protect consumers in the financial service market, will
add significantly to the federal regulation of consumer credit.12 4 In
addition to this provision,125 Dodd-Frank curbs, in large part, the
trend toward federalization of consumer financial protection through
bolstering state control over regulation.126  As such, financial
institutions will be forced to cope with not just a new federal agency
empowered to make right the global financial crisis, but also with
fifty state governments empowered to reassert the lost regulatory
prowess.127
State laws, generally, will be preempted only if they are
inconsistent with federal consumer financial protection laws.128
Moreover, a state law is not inconsistent if it provides greater
124. Schiltz, supra note 121, at 182-83. The BCFP mandate is "to implement
and . . . enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of
ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products
and services and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair,
transparent, and competitive." Dodd-Frank § 1021 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5511). The objectives of the BCFP will include ensuring that consumers receive
"timely and understand information to make responsible decisions about financial
transactions" and are protected from unfair deceptive, abusive and discriminatory
practices. Id.
125. The BCFP is discussed in greater detail in the following section along
with other provisions of Dodd-Frank related to consumer financial protection.
126. Michael Hamburger, The Dodd-Frank Act and Federal Preemption of
State Consumer Protection Law, 128 BANKING L. J. 9 (2011), see also Schiltz,
supra note 12, at 183 (stating "it is impossible to predict the exact nature of the
balance between federal and state authority" [in the wake of Dodd-Frank]). For
example, the bill rejects the Supreme Court's ruling extending preemption to non-
bank subsidiaries of national banks. Dodd-Frank § 1046 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5565). Contra Waters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20-21 (2007).
Dodd-Frank also preserves for the states authority over usury limits. Dodd-Frank §
1027(o) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o)).
127. As such, it should come as no surprise that Professor Elizabethan Warren,
named by the President to head up the BCFP, stated in reference to Dodd-Frank:
"A horde of lobbyist fought us every inch of the way . . . ." Elizabeth Warren,
Warren Outlines Goals for New Consumer Agency, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10
(2011) (quoting Professor Elizabeth Warren, Remarks Delivered at the University
of California (Oct. 28, 2010) (available at
www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg932.htm)).
128. Dodd-Frank § 1041 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551).
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"protection provided under [Dodd-Frank]." 2 9 Further, a higher
legal standard for federal preemption than was maintained by the
OCC and validated by the Supreme Court is established, permitting
preemption only if state laws are expressly preempted by federal law,
would have a discriminatory effect on national banks, or would
"prevents or significantly interferes with exercise of a national bank
of its powers."l30 These provisions suggest that state regulatory
regimes will no longer be replaced with a hollow a federal regime as
discussed above. Moreover, states will have greater flexibility in
promulgating regulations that should withstand federal
preemption. 131
On the other hand, these provisions of Dodd-Frank suggest an
embrace of federal preemption to the extent that state regulations are
weak.132  In this way, the BCFP will be able to ameliorate the
problem created by the National Bank Act and Marquette which
undermined state regulation by allowing the importation of more
favorable state regulation.' 33  However, this preemption authority
does not extend to provisions in other "enumerated consumer
laws."' 34 And although Dodd-Frank is silent on the matter, courts
will likely be in the position to review and reverse the BCFP's
129. Id. The BCFP is authorized to determine whether a state law is
inconsistent with Dodd-Frank on its own or in response to a petition by an
interested person. Id.
130. Dodd-Frank § 1044(b)(1)(B) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25(b)). The
quoted language is a direct reference to the Supreme Court decision in Barnett
Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). See 156 CONG. REc. S5902 (daily ed. July 15,
2010) (statements of Messrs. Dodd and Carper); see also Bruce, R. Christian,
Dodd-Frank Act's Language on Preemption Forces Some Quick Decisions,
Lawyers Say, 95 BNA's BANKING REP. 168 (July 27, 2010) (arguing that by
invoking Barnett, legislators intended to establish a more restrictive standard than
the one the OCC asserted in previous regulations).
131. However, it widely believed that these provisions of Dodd-Frank will
require significant judicial interpretation. See Schiltz, supra note 121, at 181-83.
132. Hamburger, supra note 126.
133. As such, South Dakota's favorable regulations may be preempted by
regulation of the BCFP, limiting the regulatory race to the bottom encouraged by
state competition for bank charters by proscribing a minimum.
134. Dodd-Frank § 1002 (to be codified as 12 U.S.C § 5481). "Enumerated
consumer laws" include of example: the Consumer leasing Act of 1976, the Fair
Credit Billing Act, the Home Owners Protection Act of 1998, the Fair Debt
Collection Protect Act, Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, the Truth in Lending Act,
Truth in Savings Act and sections of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Id.
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preemption determinations subject to the principles of judicial
deference. 135
States are further empowered through enforcement capabilities.
Dodd-Frank explicitly gives states the power to enforce its provision
and those to be promulgated by the BCFP.136  Generally, a state
attorneys general may bring a civil action in state or federal court to
enforce the federal regulations and secure remedies provided for by
federal law.1 37 In addition, state regulatory agencies are empowered
to initiate civil action or administrative proceedings to enforce Dodd-
Frank and the BCFP's regulations.' 3 8 Significantly qualifying this
provision, state attorneys general are prohibited from enforcing
provisions of Dodd-Frank against national banks, but may enforce a
BCFP regulation provided a state court or federal district court in the
state has jurisdiction over the entity.139
In order to ensure that these provisions are interpreted as
limitations on state law, Dodd-Frank expressly states that none of its
provisions limits or affects the authority of states to bring regulatory
proceedings under state law.14 0  Moreover, federal agencies are
expressly limited from utilizing limitations on "visitorial powers" to
curb state enforcement of regulations.141 While somewhat tempered,
135. See Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251, 257 (1995) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) noting that if a statute is ambiguous on the topic, the
charged agency's judgment is given "controlling weight")). However, It is unclear
if decisions concerning preemption would be given as much deference. See
Hamburger, supra note 126, at n.35 (quoting Watters, 550 U.S. at 41) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) ("[B]ecause administrative agency's are not designed to protect state's
interest, 'when an agency purports to decide the scope of federal preemption, a
healthy respect for state sovereignty call for something less than Chevron
deference."').
136. Dodd-Frank § 1042(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552).
137. Id. The court must be one with the requisite jurisdiction over the
defendant. Id.
138. Id. (requiring entity to be licensed, chartered, incorporated, or authorized
to do business under the state's laws). But see Dodd-Frank § 1002 (to be codified
as 12 U.S.C § 5481) (maintaining that this authority does not affect the provisions
of other "enumerated consumer law").
139. Dodd-Frank § 1042(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552).
140. Dodd-Frank § 1042(d) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552).
141. Dodd-Frank § 1047 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b). A provision of
the National Bank Act exempted national bank from "visitorial powers" not
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Dodd-Frank attempts to encourage official on the state level take an
active role in enforcing federal regulations.142  Working in
conjunction with the newly established federal regulator, freshly
empowered state governments create an environment where banks
will face new rules and increased pressure of enforcement.143
VII. REGULATORY HARMONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Mirroring, but to a lesser degree, the story of preemption in the
United States is the move toward regulatory harmonization in
European Union (E.U.).'" The United Kingdom, along with other
E.U. member states, has traditionally considered consumer financial
protection as a subject of national, not supra-national, authority.145
The desire for the free flow of commerce and a focus on regulatory
harmonization to achieve that end, however, has brought the issue to
authorized by federal law. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a). OCC interpreted the provision as
limiting the use of "visitorial powers" to itself alone and defined "visitorial
powers" as including: examination, inspection, regulation, supervision and
enforcement with respect to national banks. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2009). Dodd-
Frank codifies the Supreme Court's rejection of this interpretation. See Cuomo v.
Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S.Ct. 2710, 2721-22 (2009) (holding that "visitorial
powers" include only oversight and supervision, not enforcement).
142. Before a suit or proceeding is initiated, the BCFP and other federal
regulators, with authority of the defendant, must receive notice along with a copy
of the complaint from the state. Dodd-Frank § 1042(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5552). If such notice is not practical, notice must be given "immediately" upon
commencement. Id. Once given notice, the BCFP may: intervene as a party,
remove the action to federal court, and appeal any order or judgments as if it were
party, regardless as to whether it chose to intervene. Id.
143. But cf Hamburger, supra note 126, at 9 (arguing that the impact of these
changes to state authority is far from certain and will depend on the efforts of state
officials; OCC attempts to preempted state law and the judicial decisions regarding
preemption and deference).
144. A major difference in development within the U.S. and the E.U.
concerning consumer credit product is regulation of the interest rate charges on
loans, a power still firmly held by the individual member states. Schiltz, supra note
121, at 183.
145. Id. See generallY ANTHONY S. HEAD, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A GUIDE
FOR AMERICANS 5 (2009), http:// eurunion.org/eu/images/PDF/euguide2009.pdf
(discussing the history of the European Unions and its origins).
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the forefront of the E.U.'s agenda.146  While facing considerable
opposition, recent proposals stand to both buttress and limit
consumer financial protection across the continent.14 7 Nevertheless,
member states, including the United Kingdom with its influential
financial sector and regulators, are expressing timid support for
limited increased harmonization. 148
A. The Promise of Regulatory Harmony
The European Union is premised on the principle of subsidiarity,
which limits its actions, in areas not within its expressed authority, to
policies where the objective is no better pursued at the local level.149
Regarding consumer protection, the treaty organizing the E.U.
provided that:
In order to promote the interests of consumers and to
ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union
shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and
146. Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, art. 114, Sept. 5, 2008, 0. J. (C115) 94 (2008). (The E.U. "shall... adopt the
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the
establishment and functioning of the internal market. . ."); Stephen Weatherill, EU
CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 1 (Edward Elgar 2005) ("Consumer protection ...
has a bearing on what is probably the most central issue of European economic
integration, for it brings into very sharp relief the dialectics of open borders,
protectionism, and bona fide interventions of the Member State to protect
legitimate societal values and goals even if at the expense of interrupting the free
flow of goods on which the idea of a common marketplace is postulated.").
147. See, e.g., Jan M. Smits, Full Harmonisation Of Consumer Law? Critique
Of The Draft Directive On Consumer Rights (2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1358426 (last visited Mar. 20,
2010).
148. See, e.g., HOUSE of COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, European
Financial Services Regulation: Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, H.C. 778, at 8
(2006). (reckoning "new regulation will have a clear benefit to the European
economy"). However, U.K. policy makers also note that "[i]t is essential that
European policymakers ask and receive answers to the simple questions that
McCreevy is posing: Is there a case for action? Is it the EU that is best placed to
act? Is a regulatory proposal the only possible solution?" Id.
149. Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, at art. 5(3).
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economic interests of consumers, as well as to
promoting their right to information, education and to
organi[ze] themselves in order to safeguard their
interests.150
Taken together, these principles create a tension between a
positive commitment to consumer regulations at a super-national
level and a reluctance to remove national laws.' 5 ' As such, the E.U.
has relied on a theory of regulatory harmonization justifying
consumer policies in the name of economic integration, its most
fundamental principle.15 2 The theory maintains that:
[E]ven rules purporting to regulate exclusively
intrastate trade may nevertheless operate to make the
common market less 'common' and, to that extent,
impede interstate commerce. . . . Even a subject
plainly reserved as such to the States (e.g., health,
education, or public safety) is transformed into a
Community matter to whatever extent the federal
political branches find that the cross-border mobility
of goods (or, by parallel reasoning, workers, services,
or capital) would be advanced by bringing the various
national rules on the subject into closer alignment
with each other. The theory, as one eminent expert
pointed out, left 'no nucleus of sovereignty that the
Member States could invoke, as such, against the
Community.'53
150. Id. at art. 169(1).
151. Weatherill, supra note 146, at 2.
152. Id. See Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, at art. 114, (The E.U. "shall... adopt the measures for the
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and
functioning of the internal market .... )
153. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 355-357
(1994).
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The history of E.U. directives on consumer credit highlight both
tensions described above, and the theory of harmonization.' 54 The
first of these directives was in 1987, and while primarily concerned
with disclosure, it required member states to conduct some
supervision of lenders.' However, it explicitly provided that it
"shall not preclude Member States from retaining or adopting more
stringent provisions to protect consumers."' 56 The directive was
justified as promotion of market integration.'5 7 However, a series of
studies have found that the directive did not result in any significant
improvement in consumer financial protection or harmonization. 5 8
B. Total Harmonization: Maximum Standards for Member States
Responding to this initial failure and the increased focus on
consumer financial protection brought by the crisis, the E.U. in 2008
proposed a new directive on consumer credit. 5 9 Written by the E.U.
Commission, the first draft of the directive called for total
harmonization, proscribing exclusive E.U. control of virtually all
authority to substantively regulate consumer credit product.160 Such
attempts by the Commission to do for the E.U. what the Supreme
Court did for the U.S. federal government, have been met with
significant criticism from consumer groups who fear that total
harmonization would undermine more protective legislation already
in place in member states.' 6 ' The latest version represents a
154. Schiltz, supra note 121, at 189-91.
155. Id. at 189 (citing Council Directive 87/102, 1986 O.J. (L 42) (EC)).
156. Id.
157. Id. issued before the Maastricht Treaty, which identifyied consumer
protection as an issue over which the E.U. had authority, "[t]he Directive operates
on the 'assumption . . . that the consumer will benefit from the process of
integration through the enjoyment of a more efficient market, which will yield
more competition allowing wider choice, lower prices and higher-quality products
and services."' Id. at 190 (quoting Weatherill, supra note 151).
158. Schiltz, supra note 121, at 189-90 (citing Hans-W. Micklitz, Norbert
Reich, Peter Rott, UNDERSTANDING EU CONSUMER LAw 38-34 (2009)).
159. Council Directive 2008/48,2008 O.J. (L 133) (EC).
160. Schiltz, supra note 121, at 189-90 ("The draft also imposed significant
substantive regulation, including affirmative obligations on the part of lenders to
abide by a principle of 'responsible lending."').
161. See, e.g., Nikki Tait, 'Consumer Rights Bill Proposals Cause Anger,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010.
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compromise, claiming for the E.U. exclusive authority over all
matters directly addressed, but mostly limits these regulations to
disclosure requirements.1 62 Article 22(1) states that"[i]nsofar as this
Directive contains harmonized provisions, Member States may not
maintain or introduce, in their national law provisions diverging from
those laid down in this Directive." 63 Mirroring similar provisions in
Dodd-Frank, with respect to matters not directly addressed in the
2008 E.U. directive, member states retain the authority to regulate.164
The renewed emphasis on harmonization is still being debated in
the context of a proposal addressing a number of policy initiatives
concerning consumer financial protection, which was first introduced
in 2008.165 One provision in this proposal, which stands in stark
contrast to the comparable Dodd-Frank legislation, is the restriction
on member state regulations that are more stringent than those
162. Directive 2008/48/EC, O.J. (L 207) 2 (EC) Preamble P (9). The Directive
explains:
Member States may, for instance, maintain or introduce
national provisions on joint and several liability of the seller or
the service provider and the creditor. Another example of this
possibility for Member States could be the maintenance or
introduction of national provisions on the cancellation of a
contract for the sale of goods or supply of services if the
consumer exercises his right of withdrawal from the credit
agreement. In this respect Member States, in the case of open-
end credit agreements, should be allowed to fix a minimum
period needing to elapse between the time when the creditor asks
for reimbursement and the day on which the credit has to be
reimbursed. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Consumer Rights, Comm.n of the European Cmtys. (Aug. 10, 2008),
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/directivefinal EN.pdf.
165. See supra note 163. The current directives provide for minimum
harmonization because member states are left free to maintain or adopt stricter
national rules than those adopted in the respective directives; the proposals
however, would adopt the same full harmonization as in the 2008 Directive,
forbidding member states from maintaining or adopting provisions diverging from
those in the proposal. Id.; see also, Nikki Tait, EU Moves on 'Unfair' Bank
Charges, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011.
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promulgated by the E.U.166 It has been argued that a standardized set
of regulations that maintain maximum and minimum threshold
limitations on consumer financial protection benefits the economy
and ultimately provides consumers with greater protection.167 This
curious logic, which forbids stricter regulations on consumer
financial product for the sake of consumer protection, forms the basis
for criticism of total harmonization that has only increased with the
advent of the global financial crisis.168
VIII. DOUBLING DowN ON CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Recent developments in the United Kingdom suggest that policy
makers there are not too worried about E.U. directives taking away
their nation's initiative to regulate consumer financial protection. On
the contrary, the global financial crisis has only led government
166. See supra note 163. ("Member States may not maintain or introduce, in
their national law, provisions diverging from those laid down in this Directive,
including more or less stringent provisions to ensure a different level of consumer
protection.") with Dodd-Frank § 1041 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551)
(describing a state law as not inconsistent, and permissible not inconsistent, if it
provides greater "protection provided under [Dodd-Frank].").
167. Colette Cuijpers & Bert-Jaap Koops, EURO. L. REv. 2008, 33(6), 880-
897, 896, How Fragmentantion in European Law Undermines Consumer
Protection: The Case of Location-Based Services. (arguing that "fragmentation
erodes both pillars of European law-making in the area of consumer protection:
neither harmonization nor a high level of protection is achieved. The legal
uncertainty caused by fragmented rules both constitutes a disincentive to promising
new technologies and services within the internal market and undermines an
adequate level of consumer protection throughout the European Union"). But see:
Commission Staff Working Document - European Financial Integration Report,
Comm'n of the European Cmtys. 37 §2(1) (Oct. 12, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/intemalmarket/finances/docs/cross-sector/fin-
integration/efir report 2007 en.pdf (warning that a harmonized regulatory regime
and "market links do not only contribute to risk diversification but may also serve
as channels for cross-border contagion, transmitting risks across the financial
system").
168. lain Martin, FSA Warns Europe: Don't Impose Blanket Rules on
Financial Services, CITYWIRE, (Jan 27, 2011), http://citywire.co.uk/new-model-
adviser/fsa-warns-europe-dont-impose-blanket-rules-on-financial-services/a466729
("We do not think that consumers are well-served if there is maximum harmonizing
legislation that in some way equates the mortgage market in Slovenia to the Dutch
market to our own.").
officials to rethink financial regulation and place a greater emphasis
on regulating consumer credit products. Regulators in the United
Kingdom have warned the E.U. Commission considering more
expansive supra-national regulations by stating that the "most
effective way [regulators] can protect consumers is to tailor
regulation in a way that combats the specific market failures which
they face."' 69 This Section discusses the reforms being pursued in the
United Kingdom that will, independently of the E.U., add to the
growing financial regulatory structure.
A. The Fall of the Financial Service Authority
"At the heart of the crisis was a rapid and unsustainable increase
in debt that our macroeconomic and regulatory system utterly failed
to identify let alone prevent," stated the United Kingdom's new
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, when he announced
abolishment of the Financial Services Authority ("FSA").70 The
FSA has been the dominant financial regulator in the United
Kingdom for more than a decade.' 7 1 In 1997, then Chancellor of the
Exchequer Gordon Brown transferred bank and financial service
regulation from the Bank of England to the FSA.172 Along with the
Treasury, the three regulators formed a tripartite system intended to
facilitate discussion of issues, the exchange of information, and the
coordination of responses to any problems in the sector.173 In the
169. Id.
170. Gonzalo Vina, UK. Scraps FSA, Reversing System Set Up by Brown,
BUISNESSWEEK, (June 17, 2010), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-17/u-k-scraps-fsa-reversing-system-
set-up-by-brown-update2-.html. ("He's blamed the system established by former
Labour Prime Minister Brown for failing to prevent a financial crisis that saddled
taxpayers with liabilities of as much as 1.4 trillion pounds ($2.1 trillion) and
plunged the economy into the worst recession since World War II.").
171. See G. WALKER AND M. BLAIR, FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW I (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006). See also D. SINGH, BANKING REGULATION OF UK
AND US FINANCIAL MARKETS (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007) (comparing
U.S. and U.K. regulators).
172. Philip Rawlings, Reform of Bank Regulation in the United Kingdom: the
Opening Salvo, J. INT'L BANKING L. REG. 2010, 2010, 25(10), 522-528.
173. Luis Garicano & Rosa M. Lastra, Towards a New Architecture for
Financial Stability: Seven Principles, J. INT'L EcoN. L., 13(3), 597-621, 601-02
(2010). Spelled out in a Memorandum of Understanding in 1997, the Bank of
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initial response to the crisis, the Government, led by Prime Minister
Gordon Brown, further bolstered the FSA's authority.'74 His
government was ousted from power in May, 2010, replaced by a
coalition government dedicated to ending the FSA's hegemony.' 7 5
The new government, led by the Conservative party, has long
opposed the FSA and the tripartite system of regulation, claiming it is
ineffective at monitoring risks.176 The Conservative's Chancellor of
the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced a radical redrafting of
financial regulation on June 16, 2010, which was followed by the
publication of a consultation document on July 26, 2010.1' The
reform is rooted in a belief that the existing regulatory structure
meant that no one had sufficient responsibility for critical issues, and
thus, no regulator was in a position to recognize the coming of the
crisis and prevent or react to it.178 The Bank of England will regain
much of its regulatory authority and will sit at the center of the new
England acts palender of last resort, the FSA is the supervisor and the Treasury is
responsible for the fiscal costs of bail-outs. See The Turner Review: A Regulatory
Response to the Global Banking Crisis, Fin. Servs. Auth. (March 2009), available
athttp://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/library/corporate/tumer/index.shtml.
174. See The Financial Service and Markets Act of 2010.
175. The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, (May 20, 2010),
available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg-coalition.pdf. "We
therefore find ourselves in this uncomfortable interim period, during which very
significant changes to the regulatory system are being implemented, yet in the
knowledge that the regime as a whole is soon to be dismantled by the new
government and rebuilt from scratch." Nathan Willmott; Peter McGowan; Mark
Ghusn; Victoria Brocklehurst; Rachel Aikens; Sarah Bailey; Mark Scodi; James
Palme; Ruth Whorto; and Alexander Gold, Equipping the modem regulator:
assessing the new regulatory powers,(can't find this anywhere thus send back to
author) COMPLIANCE OFFICER BULLETIN, 78(Jul/Aug), 1-28, 2 (2010). However,
the coalition government stated on June 17, 2010, that the Consumer Protection and
Markets Authority will continue to have an important role in the new regulatory
architecture. See id. at 18.
176. Economy, Conservatives,
http://www.conservatives.com/policy/where-we-stand/economy.aspx. See also
The Coalition, supra note 175.
177. A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Judgment, Focus and Stability
CM 7874, HM Treasury (July 2010), http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_financial regulation-condoc.pdf.
178. Id. The Bank focused on monetary policy rather than financial stability,
and the FSA concentrated on the supervision of individual institutions and paid
insufficient attention to wider risks. Id.
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regulatory regime.' 79 The remainder of the FSA will essentially be
replaced by three new agencies: Prudential Regulatory Authority,
which is part of the Bank of England; the Economic Crime Agency;
and the Consumer Protection and Markets Authority ("CPMA"). 80
B. The Financial Conduct Authority
On February 16, 2011, United Kingdom government authorities
announced that the CPMA will be renamed the Financial Conduct
Authority ("FCA"), "[i]n order to reflect more directly its role."' 81
The FCA, a "separate and focused conduct regulator with tailored
objectives, functions and powers," parallels the BCFP established in
the United States under Dodd-Frank. 182 The agency found support in
a very influential report commissioned by the treasury that linked
consumer financial protect to the crisis.183 The FCA will act as a
"consumer champion."' 84 However, it "should not be confused with
179. George Osborne, "Speech at the Lord Mayor's dinner". Also, Hansard,
HC, col.1056 (June 17, 2010) ("Our thinking is informed by this insight: only
independent central banks have the broad macroeconomic understanding, the
authority and the knowledge required to make the kind of macro-prudential
judgments that are required now and in the future.").
180. A New Approach to Financial Regulations: Judgment, Focus and
Stability, supra note 177.This supervisory and regulatory overhaul is expected to
be completed in 2012. Id.
181. HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION:
BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM, CM 8012, 59-60, (Feb. 2010) ("[T]he FCA will
have, as its core purpose, protecting and enhancing the confidence of all consumers
of financial services ... ."). Id. at 60.
182. See id. at 59 (emphasis added). In the words of Chancellor of the
Exchequer Osborne: "We will also establish a powerful new Consumer Protection
and Markets Authority. It will regulate the conduct of every authorized financial
firm providing services to consumers. It will also be responsible for ensuring the
good conduct of business in the UK's retail and wholesale financial services, in
order to preserve our reputation for transparency and efficiency as well as our
position as one of the world's leading global financial centres." Speech by Osborne,
supra note 178.
183. A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger System,
supra note 180.
184. Id. FCA will also operate to meet a statutory objective to promote market
efficiency. Id.
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that of consumer advocate organi[za]tions.'8 5
The FCA's strategic objective will be to ensure consumer
confidence in the financial service sector.' 86 The FCA's operational
objectives are: "facilitating efficiency and choice in the market for
financial services; securing an appropriate degree of protection for
consumers; and protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK
financial system."' 8  The FCA will have rule-making functions and
will be the sole regulator for "a significant majority" of financial
institutions in the United Kingdom.' 8 8  Although independent, the
Consumer Financial Education Body will be under the auspices of
the FCA and will be charged with raising the public's knowledge and
understanding of financial matters and will enhance their ability to
manage their own affairs. 18 9
It has been argued that "the creation of the [FCA] should improve
efficiency by bringing together consumer protection and conduct of
business issues spread between the FSA" and other regulators.190
Nevertheless, the regulatory state of affairs in the United Kingdom is
far from certain, even when compared to the United States and the
E.U.; and in any event, a financial institution can expect to find a new
regulator regime in the United Kingdom empowered to aggressively
pursue expanding objectives. 191
185. Id. ("The FCA will be an entirely impartial regulator from whom firms
and consumers can expect fair treatment.").
186. Id. at 61. (Feb. 2010) ("Conduct of business regulation has a fundamental
role to play in protecting and enhancing that confidence in the UK financial
system.").
187. Id. at 62. Further, "[t]he FCA must, so far as is compatible with its
strategic and operational objectives, discharge its general functions in a way which
promotes competition." Id.
188. Id. at 69.
189. Id. at 102.
190. Philip Rawlings, Reform of Bank Regulation in the United Kingdom: The
Opening Salvo, J. journal volume # INT'L BANKING L. REG. 25(10), 522-28, 526
(2010).
191. Compliance Officer Bulletin states that professionals face:
[A] prolonged period of radical change to UK financial
services regulation. As firms adapt to and seek to understand the
new powers recently bestowed upon the FSA, they are also
beginning their preparations for life under a new regime. What is
clear is that the risk and compliance burden on firms will
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IX. CONCLUSION - UNCERTAINTY FROM DEREGULATION
This Comment highlighted the critical changes occurring in the
structure of financial regulation around the world. The environment
is far from settled and will likely remain so for the foreseeable
future.192  Lasting uncertainty is just one of many challenges
financial institutions will be forced to grapple with in the coming
years. The roots of these challenges can be found in the conclusion
held by policy makers that regulators failed to protect consumers
from a failed market for consumer credit, and that this failure of
government led to an economic collapse. In Europe and in the
United States, this conclusion has led to the creation and
revitalization of regulators with new authorities. Moreover, these
new regulators are empowered by the persisting realities and
memories of the global financial crisis along with the painful
recession that came in its wake.
Much of the substantive regulation that will come from
Washington, London, and Brussels will be unwise and not aimed at
addressing the causes of the financial crisis. Leaders will, of course,
use the concept of the crisis to implement plans conjured up long
before the collapse of the American housing market. Nevertheless,
as this comment shows, the responses to the global financial crisis
have led to significant reversals in regulatory trends towards
deregulation. Preemption in the United States led to de facto
deregulation. The mess this caused, however, is now being used to
justify a regulatory regime that stands the possibility of being more
hostile to lenders than any in the past. Before advocating for further
harmonization in Europe, financial institutions may want to reflect on
continue to grow as they gear up for dealing with multiple
regulators who will wield an expanding selection of supervisory
and enforcement tools, and who can be expected to use those
tools aggressively to pursue their potentially inconsistent
regulatory objectives. Id.
192. See, e.g., Jessica Holzer, Financial Regulator Appoints Top Team, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 18, 2011, (discussing the build-up of the BCFP in Washington, D.C.);
Simon Clark & Ben Moshinsky, 'Arrogant' London Bankers Learn to Lobby
Brussels as Power Moves, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 14, 2011, ("London, the financial
capital of Europe, is coming to grips with a foreign concept: None of its three most
important regulators speaks with a British accent.").
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how deregulation has left them more tied down than ever.
